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Violence  is key  to understanding  human  interaction  and  societal  development.  The  natural
state of societal  organization  is that  a subset  of  the population,  capable  of mustering  orga-
nized large-scale  violence,  forms  an  elite  coalition  that  restrains  both  violence  and  coercive
appropriation.  We  highlight  key  mechanisms  underlying  such  natural  states.  Our results
show that  natural  states  either  have  a large  elite  coalition  and  a high  tax rate,  or a weak  elite
and  a  high  level  of  appropriation  by  a  large  group  of  violence  specialists  outside  the  elite,
termed  warlords.  When  output  elasticity  of effort  is  high,  it induces  elite  members  to limit
their tax  rate,  which  in  turn  promotes  warlordism.  Only  when  the elite  coalition  is small
but  still  able  to control  a sizeable  share  of  production,  as  a  result  of  its  cooperative  quality
and a low  decisiveness  of conﬂict  between  elite  and  warlords,  do  we ﬁnd  comparatively
high  levels  of  production  and  producer  welfare.  Our  results  imply  that  almost  all  natural
states  experience  continuous  coercion  exercised  by elite  members  and  violence  between
elite coalitions  and  warlords.  We show  that  this  is not  a temporary  out-of-equilibrium-
situation  but  a permanent  phenomenon,  as  can most  conspicuously  be  observed  in  parts
of Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Our model  thus  illustrates  the  rigidity  of natural  states.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
Violence is key to understanding human interaction and societal development. A society that is unable to contain violence
ill be disrupted and cannot be expected to sustain high levels of welfare, as is painfully illustrated by the current situation in
fghanistan, Libya or, perhaps most conspicuously, parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries like Congo, Somalia, and Sudan are
lmost continuously torn up by extortion and coercion under the threat of violence, factional strife, and intermittent periods
f open violence. Such conditions may  destroy lives and capital goods, and deter interaction, exchange, investment, trade,
nd the beneﬁts of specialization that come with trade, leading to signiﬁcant welfare losses (Hirshleifer, 1988; Skaperdas
nd Syropoulos, 2002; North et al., 2013).The ways in which societies cope with the threat of endemic violence are intrinsically linked up with, or embedded in,
heir economic and political systems. These systems structure the distribution of rents in order to contain the destructive
ffects of unconstrained violence on production, the economy, and society at large (North et al., 2009). One archetype of
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such systems is formed by open, democratic governments, combined with competitive economies, and a state monopoly
on violence which limits the incidence of violence. Few societies, however, conform to this pattern. Instead, most historical
and many contemporary societies are dominated by a ruling elite that combines exclusive economic, political, and military
advantages over the rest of society. Theoretically, such an elite is willing to maintain order – i.e. restrict violence within
society – when its beneﬁts of taxing society exceed the cost of maintaining order and the opportunity costs of restricting its
own direct appropriation (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). However, a high level of the required
‘tax rate’ and the difﬁculty of effectively limiting violence pose two possibly serious restrictions on economic development
in these natural states.
These potential restrictions can be observed in many historical and contemporaneous societies that may  be characterized
as natural states, be it the feudal societies of mediaeval Europe and Japan, or present-day societies in much of Latin America,
the Middle East and Africa. In such societies, the elite brings together their political parties, ethnic groups, patronage networks
and associated organizations into a coalition, and commits to restrict violence among themselves and, possibly, towards the
rest of society. This coalition, in fact, forms ‘the state’ in natural states, according to North et al. (2009), and in contrast to for
instance Bates (2008) who views the elite as separate from the state. Doing so, the coalition can create and distribute rents.
Rents may  be created by way of monopolies, exclusive rights to trade, subsidies, redistribution of taxes, or privileges to exploit
natural resources. Especially in resource-rich areas such privileges are a crucial source of rents, and a potential source of
conﬂicts, both in historical and present-day natural states, as in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, including the Democratic
Republic of Congo, with its huge deposits of cobalt, oil, copper, diamond and tin (Olsson and Congdon Fors, 2004; Kaiser and
Wolters, 2013). The latter case illustrates the potential problems for these natural states, as Congo is intermittently plagued
by high levels of appropriation – through rent extraction and extortion – by the elite coalition and its rivals, as well as by
outbreaks of open violence, as in the 1990s when various militias, political factions and ethnic groups militarily challenged
the elite coalition (Bates et al., 2002; Bates, 2008; Kaiser and Wolters, 2013). Arguably, the problem of endemic violence
and outbursts of open violence is most severe in countries with abundant natural resources, as the gains from violence are
higher and there is more to be reaped (Sachs and Warner, 2001; van der Ploeg, 2011). Recent research indicates that the
resource curse is not extricably linked to resource abundance, but can materialize in a context of low-quality institutions,
where state competence, transparency and democratic accountability are weak; a situation found in natural states (Bulte
et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006).
In this paper we present a model to probe the existence of elite coalitions and the economic mechanisms of natural states.
Thus, inspired by North et al. (2009), we address why elite members are unable or unwilling to effectively limit violence
and, possibly, appropriation in natural states despite the evident welfare losses. We  start from the assertion that there is no
monopoly on violence in natural states, concentrated in a state. Instead, the capacity to exert violence – or coercion under
the threat of violence – in an organized fashion and on substantial scale is concentrated in a small subset of the population,
which opportunistically exploits this capacity to appropriate production from the producing population. In this we follow
North et al. (2009) and other recent work. Francois et al. (2015) convincingly show that the ruling elite in countries in sub-
Saharan Africa consists of a group of people who individually have substantial control over parts of the country’s population.
According to the same authors, the consequence of not incorporating a wide enough range of such individuals is that they
might instigate a rebellion through their patronage network – we  will refer to such individuals with the capacity to organize
and orchestrate large-scale violence as ‘violence specialists’. To North et al. (2009), a coalition of such violence specialists
is the only possible social structure that limits violence in societies beyond the scope of foraging societies, and apart from
modern open democracies.
There exists a substantial literature analysing incentives in terms of production and offensive or defensive violence activ-
ities in anarchical states – in the absence of a monopoly of violence – (cf. Hirshleifer, 1988; Skaperdas, 1992; Grossman and
Kim, 1995). However, the capacity for violence is often dispersed over the entire population. And if hierarchical state struc-
tures are considered, then the violence capacities of ordinary producers are often contrasted to an individual or monolithic
elite with the capacity to control the entire population that, as a result, has the opportunity to operate as a Leviathan-like
source of order (Usher, 1989; Hirshleifer, 1995; Grossman, 2002; Bates et al., 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Konrad
and Skaperdas, 2012). We  stress that the nature of violence considered in this paper, however, is of a higher level than the
banditry-type of violence commonly considered in the literature on the economics of conﬂict and appropriation (for an
overview of this literature, see Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Konrad, 2009), and that ordinary producers cannot there-
fore decide to become specialists in violence. In addition, the capacity for large-scale violence is the domain of a small, but
substantial group of violence specialists who do not necessarily work together, instead of a monolithic elite or elite group.
Organized and large-scale violence comprises the possibility to assemble small armies of loyal troops or mercenaries.
More generally, violence specialists have the skills to generate and maintain a patronage network of followers that can,
in turn, be used to exert violence – or coercion – on others. In our model, violence specialists face a choice either to join
forces in a coalition of equals wherein they accept to respect each other’s privileges and income, or to individually exploit
their violence capacities for appropriative activities as ‘warlords’. This coalition – subsequently termed the elite coalition
– provides elite members with relative security over speciﬁc sources of income. This, in turn, induces the elite members
to take account of the effects of their appropriation on production. Warlords, in contrast, lacking the support and accepted
privileges characterizing the elite, do not incorporate the effect of their appropriation on production into their decision and,
thus, appropriate all production under their control. Warlords may  be the leaders of guerilla movements (e.g. Colombia),
revolting militias (Somalia) or the leaders of independent clans or tribes (Afghanistan). The number of warlords relative to
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lite members can vary over time. Examples of rapidly growing numbers of warlords are Liberia in the 1980s, as ofﬁcers
ith their soldiers left the government army and turned predatory (Bates et al., 2002); or the earlier cited case of Congo in
he 1990s (Bates et al., 2002; Bates, 2008; Kaiser and Wolters, 2013). Although warlords do not take into account how their
ppropriation affects production, their appropriation is not necessarily violent. Instead, their appropriation generally takes
lace as coercion under the threat of violence even though their rate of appropriation is unconstrained. The appropriation
ate imposed by the elite is also based on coercion rather than violence, but is self-constrained – and, hence, referred to
s a tax rate. Coercive appropriation could, of course, turn into open violence. However, the real source of open violence
nd instability in natural states is violent competition between violence specialists, that is between the elite coalition and
arlords.1
A direct implication of our discussion of violence specialists as capable of organizing large-scale violence is that entry and
xit of violence specialists is exceptional. Depending on the speciﬁc setting, membership of the class of violence specialists
s by inheritance, as with hereditary membership of a noble caste or the feudal nobility, or by a combination of wealth,
nheritance, standing, and social networks. This is exactly one of the characteristics of natural states, where social mobility
s highly restricted, in contrast to more open societies, including many present-day, Western ones (North et al., 2009). Sub-
aharan Africa is a case in point, as the chiefs and tribal leaders derive their vital positions in society from customary or
ereditary sources, as most can claim a descent from elite lineages (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Herbst, 2014;
aldwin, 2016). Entry is therefore very exceptional, while exit is possible, but in principle not attractive in view of the time
nd means invested in acquiring this position and the possible gains it brings. As such, our model is closer to real-world
ituations and departs from models where agents can switch between production and (offensive or defensive) violence
ctivities (cf. Hirshleifer, 1995; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012). In our model, producing agents
ave no means to engage in organized large-scale violence, and, simultaneously, they have no means to defend against such
iolence.
A key feature of the model we present is the interaction between the behaviour of violence specialists and produc-
ion. Production is the domain of a separate class of actors in our model; the producers. Producers have no capacity for
arge-scale violence and, thus, are completely vulnerable to appropriation by both types of violence specialists. Producers
o respond to appropriation by limiting their investment in production – which, in the model implies that they restrict
effort’, the sole input in the production function.2 Contrary to the above mentioned literature on elite behaviour in nat-
ral states, the appropriation rate faced by producers is the aggregate rate of appropriation – the combination of the tax
ate of the elite coalition and the pure appropriation by warlords – determined by a group of individually optimizing vio-
ence specialists. That is, violence specialists compete over a single pool of production (as in Skaperdas, 2002) where the
ehaviour of each individual violence specialist affects the payoff to other violence specialists. This is in sharp contrast to
he theoretical work closest to ours by Konrad and Skaperdas (2012) who  model competition among elites that have a pri-
ate resource pool and emphasize the welfare losses associated with ‘warlord states’ compared to states of self-organized
roducers.
In a nutshell our model is as follows. Violence specialists either join the elite coalition or become a warlord. Depending
n the relative size of each group, the elite and warlords each control a share of the total population, and production.
oth elite members and warlords use their violence capacity to appropriate production, but they do so in distinct ways.
he elite resembles a ‘stationary bandit’, by enforcing a tax on production to support their coalition, taking into account
 in the spirit of McGuire and Olson (1996) – that a high tax rate deters production. This tax rate should be interpreted
roadly as encompassing all possible forms of rent extraction, and the optimal level of rent extraction may  be very high, for
nstance when the marginal effect of taxation on production is low. Warlords do not levy taxes but instead they exploit their
iolence capacity to appropriate as much production as they can. This advantage of warlords over elite members in terms
f rent extraction is partly mitigated by cooperation of the elite in the coalition, based on the mutual agreement to respect
ach other’s privileges and collectively defend these against warlords. In response to the expected level of appropriation,
roducers – modelled as one representative producer – decide how much effort to devote to production. The key outcomes
f the model are the tax rate set by the elite, the ratio of elite members to warlords, and the production decision of the
epresentative producer.
The model provides four main insights. First, the tax rate imposed by the elite depends on the output elasticity of effort.
hat is, the elite limits tax rates when output elasticity is high. This in turn, increases the tendency of violence specialists
o become warlord, at least partially offsetting the effect of limited taxation on the aggregate rate of appropriation. Con-
equently, natural states generally face high rates of appropriation either by a strong elite coalition or, when a weak elite
s willing to limit its appropriation, by a relatively high number of warlords. This result corroborates studies and theories
ighlighting the rigidity of natural states. Second, comparatively high levels of production and producer welfare occur only
hen output elasticity is high – inducing lower tax rates by the elite – in combination with strong cooperative quality of
he elite and low decisiveness of conﬂict between the elite and warlords – allowing the small elite to control a relatively
1 In our model we  do not explicitly separate violence and coercion and take their effect on production to be similar. Of course, violence would lead to
utright  destruction and, thus, decrease production further than through producer incentives alone. However, including this effect simply decreases total
roduction while not changing our results qualitatively.
2 ‘Effort’ is a stylized term to capture several mechanisms through which appropriation leads to reduced production.
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large share of total production. Only then will producers beneﬁt from the lower tax rates set by the elite. Third, we  provide
intuition on some of the internal mechanisms of the elite coalition. This we  relate to the organizational and institutional
development of the elite coalition, following North et al. (2009) who  describe a maturation process of elite coalitions.3 The
cooperative nature of controlling production and taxing the production under control could lead to conﬂict over distribution
within the coalition, which we address in a ﬁrst extension of the model. Furthermore, the collective nature of the coalition
triggers questions over the optimal size of the coalition and possibly restrictions on the number of elite members, which
we discuss in a second extension. The fourth main insight we provide, albeit more tentatively, is that our results suggest an
‘institutions-induced resource curse’, where low cooperative quality, and the context of the natural state more generally,
can be equated with weak institutions, and high output elasticity of effort to the abundance of natural resources. In this
interpretation, better institutions within the elite coalition (higher cooperative quality of the elite) allow society to beneﬁt
from natural resources (higher elasticity of output). However, the third necessary condition required for relatively high
levels of production in our model is that the decisiveness of conﬂict remains low, which is difﬁcult to reconcile with the
point-based nature of natural resources as found in many regions of sub-Saharan Africa (Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum et al.,
2006).
2. Model
Consider a natural state with a population of ﬁxed size. There are two subsets of individuals in this society. The ﬁrst
comprises producers, whose production decisions are aggregated in Section 2.3 into a single decision by a representative
producer. The second comprises violence specialists, denoted by the set V. Each violence specialist is either an elite member
or a warlord, denoted by the sets E and V, respectively. We have E ⊂ V and W = V \ E. In our model there is no mobility between
violence specialists and producers, with the exception of a model extension presented in Section 4.3. The two  sets E and
V are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive with respect to V, but we  explicitly allow for mobility between them.
Members of each set are homogeneous in all relevant aspects. We will often refer to elites and warlords by their number:
e = |E| and w = |W |.
Violence specialists i ∈ V can appropriate production from the producers in two different ways, and this appropriation
decision is determined by their choice of occupation. Elite members cooperate and appropriate by levying a jointly deter-
mined tax on their controlled production, while warlords appropriate by stealing all of their controlled production. This
model feature is a stylized representation of the warlords’ uncertain power base which makes them myopic in their decision
on how much to appropriate.4 The two occupations exert negative externalities, because the amount of production appro-
priated by warlords decreases the production available for appropriation by elite members, and vice versa. As a result, elite
members and warlords compete over the share of total production either side controls. From the side of the elite members,
this can be interpreted as either (i) the share of society whereon they effectively impose order, or (ii) the extent to which
they succeed in establishing order over the entire population.
Our main simplifying assumption is that we consider violence specialists as individuals, and their capacities as homo-
geneous. Recall that we consider violence specialists as having the skills to generate and maintain a patronage network of
followers. Our assumption of violence specialists as homogeneous individuals has three main implications. First, homogene-
ity removes any reason to discriminate between violence specialists of the same occupation. As a result, payoffs are equal
across elite members as well as across warlords. Second, we can abstract from the speciﬁcities of the formation and size
of patronage networks. Third, we need not explicitly model entry and exit into the elite coalition although we discuss this
in more detail in Section 4.2. In reality, as a result of competition over the tax rents within the coalition, the composition
of the coalition may  be continuously changing, as power relations between members change, and because members with
negligible contributions are weeded out and, potentially, substituted for new members.
Given this simpliﬁcation, our model allows us to focus on the violence specialists’ choice whether or not to join the elite
coalition, and its implications for production levels and producer welfare. This choice depends on the relative proﬁtability of
each occupation. Violence specialists can switch occupations without cost and do so until payoffs are equalized.5 As a result,
each equilibrium features a speciﬁc distribution of elite members and warlords. The occupation choice by violence specialists
is the ﬁrst stage of a three-stage model. The stages are shortly described below and worked out in detail in Section 3. In
addition, In Section 4 we present extensions of the model with an additional stage that features conﬂict within the coalition,
a discussion of the propensity of elite members to limit the size of the coalition, and an extension on the endogenous size of
the group of violence specialists.
3 Following North et al. (2009) in terms of the maturity of natural states, our model may  apply more closely to fragile and basic natural states than to
mature  natural states.
4 In addition, since warlords operate alone – and given a sufﬁciently large number of violence specialists – individual appropriation rates have only
negligible impact on production so that myopic behaviour is not an assumption but an implication from the model introduced below.
5 The model guarantees internal solutions featuring equilibria with strictly positive amounts of warlords and elite members, as we will demonstrate
below.
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.1. Occupation choice (Stage 1)
Each violence specialist i ∈ V decides to join the elite coalition or not. We  denote this occupation choice by i ∈ {1,
} ∀ i ∈ V. If i = 1, the specialist joins the elite coalition. If i = 0, the specialist becomes a warlord. The outcome of these
ecisions is a vector  = (i : i ∈ V) that partitions the violence specialists in two  subsets: the elite coalition E = {i : i = 1} and
ts complement W = V \ E = {i : i = 0} comprising all warlords.
Control over producers by elite members and warlords is given deterministically by the ratio ew (see (17)). We  use the
ollowing function to determine the share of total production that is controlled by elites:
(e, w)  = e
m
em + wm , (1)
ith m ∈ (0, 1) and  ∈ [1, ∞). It follows that the share of total production that is controlled by warlords equals 1 − (e, w).
A few comments on (1) are appropriate here.
First, its functional form is borrowed from the rent seeking literature (Tullock, 1980). Our speciﬁcation of (e, w)  is based
n a modiﬁcation of the ratio-form contest success function (CSF), inspired by the axiomatic characterization of group CSFs
y Münster (2009). Parameter m is conventionally interpreted as the decisiveness of conﬂict, and here we interpret it as
he decisiveness of group size, where group refers to either the elite coalition or the aggregate of warlords. Given m < 1,
here are diminishing marginal returns to group formation. Speciﬁcally, low m implies that a small elite coalition (group
f warlords) is capable of controlling a relatively large share of production. Parameter  represents a ﬁghting asymmetry
cf. Usher, 1989; Clark and Riis, 1998) in favour of the elite coalition that we  consider to be better organized than warlords,
ecause of their commitment to respect each other’s privileges. In the context of North et al. (2009) one could interpret  as
he cooperative quality, or maturity, of the coalition, with more mature coalitions capable of organizing and coordinating
ower more efﬁciently.6 One implication of this functional form is that the elite may  control a larger share of production,
ven if it is smaller in size than the aggregate of warlords.
Second, note that our interpretation of (e, w) is non-probabilistic in the sense that it represents a share, rather than a
inning probability (although the two interpretations are equivalent under the assumption of risk neutrality). For a detailed
iscussion of CSFs and their interpretations, see Hirshleifer (2000), Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007), and Konrad (2009).
Third, although we talk freely about the share of production that is controlled by warlords, the degree of cooperation by
arlords has not been speciﬁed yet. In the functional form chosen in (1), warlords do work together, but have a ﬁghting
isadvantage compared with the elite, through . The alternative approach is to model warlords as operating alone, using
he term w × 1m rather than wm, which would imply
′(e, w) = e
m
em + w × 1m =
em
em + w . (2)
his alternative speciﬁcation, however, has two disadvantages: (i) It would give the coalition a ﬁghting disadvantage for any
 < 1, so that the effects of m and  may  cancel each other out. This disadvantage is reversed for m > 1. In our model set-up,
owever, if  is sufﬁciently large, then m > 1 leads to a corner solution where all specialists end up in the elite coalition.7
his is a standard feature of the ratio-form CSF, discussed in detail by Hirshleifer (1995) and employed by Skaperdas (1998)
o assess coalition formation in a different setting. (ii) Using ′(e, w) to calculate the equilibrium ratio of elite members to
arlords, as we do for (e, w) in (14), would lead to asymptotic behaviour of this ratio, including discontinuities and negative
utcomes. Both features are undesirable and we stick to (1).
Fourth and ﬁnal, our speciﬁcation of (e, w) deviates from the standard approach in the economic literature on conﬂict
nd appropriation. Most importantly, this contest is deterministic in the sense that the outcome of the contest depends only
n the ratio ew . Notably, it does not depend on costly investments in violence capacity. That is, in the Stage 2 contest, elite
embers and warlords do not explicitly choose their violence level as is conventional in models that feature a trade-off
etween own production and appropriation (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1988, 1995; Skaperdas, 1992; Grossman and Kim, 1995) or in
ent-seeking models (Nitzan, 1994). We  focus, however, on organized large-scale violence and, in our model, the capacity
or such violence is restricted to violence specialists, while production is the domain of the separate subset of producers. As
 result, violence specialists are not confronted with this trade-off between own  production and appropriation. In addition,
otivated by the homogeneity of violence specialists, the only effect of adding costly investments in violence would be that
ayoffs of violence specialists would be reduced in the symmetric outcome of such a model, without any qualitative impacts
n model results..2. Tax (Stage 2)
Given the outcome of Stage 1, the elite controls a share (e, w)  and warlords jointly control a share 1 − (e, w),  which each
f them can appropriate as they wish. Following the main features of the natural state as discussed above, elite members
6 See van Bavel et al. (2016) who provide a historical exploration of the role of organizations on .
7 Speciﬁcally, a corner solution results if (1 − ˛) ≥ 1, where parameter  ˛ is the output elasticity to effort introduced in Section 2.3).
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collectively determine their tax rate  ∈ [0, 1], while warlords, by construction, choose to appropriate all production under
their control.
2.3. Production (Stage 3)
In modelling production, we choose to aggregate production decisions by all producers into a single decision by a rep-
resentative producer, although the same functional form would be obtained by assuming a set of homogeneous producers,
each working a plot of land with symmetric concavity in effort. Given the outcome of Stages 1–2, the representative producer
chooses its joint production level. We  model production Y as a single-input production function with effort  as input.
Y() = ˇ˛. (3)
Parameter  ˛ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the output elasticity of effort. Parameter  ˇ ∈ (0, ∞)  reﬂects total factor productivity, which in
the presence of only one factor of production, we will refer to as a technology parameter.
Appropriation by elite members and warlords reduces the amount of produce available for consumption. Producers
maximize utility U which equals aggregate consumption – production net of appropriation – minus the cost of effort.
U = (1 − )(e, w)Y() − , (4)
with cost parameter  ∈ (0, ∞).
Given our main assumption that violence specialists are homogeneous, payoffs i are equal across warlords as well as
across elite members. Incorporating all decisions made in Stages 2–4, this implies the following payoff functions to violence
specialists:
i =
(
1
e
)
(e, w)Y() ∀i ∈ E; (5)
j =
(
1
w
)
(1 − (e, w))Y() ∀j ∈ W.  (6)
The stability concept that we use to evaluate outcomes of the model is a simple equilibrating mechanism that equates payoffs
to elite members and warlords. That is, in Stage 1 violence specialists choose the most proﬁtable occupation. They make this
choice whilst taking into account (i) the optimal tax rate that will be chosen by the elite, and (ii) the optimal response in
terms of production by the representative producer. Hence, in equilibrium, payoffs to elite members and warlords are equal.
If not, then a proﬁtable switch of occupation could be made by at least one violence specialist, while taking into account
that changing occupations shifts the balance of power between warlords and the elite coalition with subsequent impacts
on the outcomes of Stages 2–3. This equilibrating mechanism is reminiscent of more advanced stability concepts applied in
alliance models and non-cooperative models of coalition formation (cf. Skaperdas, 1998; Yi, 2003; Garﬁnkel, 2004).
3. Results
In this section we present the results of our model. Solving the model backwards, we  analyse each of the four stages
consecutively.
3.1. Production (Stage 3)
Given outcomes of Stages 1–2, the representative producer chooses  to maximize utility (4):
∂U
∂
= (1 − )(e, w)∂Y()
∂
−  = 0. (7)
By the production function in (3) we have
∂Y()
∂
= ˛ˇ˛−1. (8)
Substituting this derivative into (7) and solving for , we obtain:
∗ =
(
(1 − )(e, w)˛ˇ

) 1
1−˛
. (9)
Substituting this equilibrium level of effort into (3) and solving for Y, we obtain:( ) ˛
Y∗ = ˇ (1 − )(e, w)˛ˇ

1−˛
. (10)
We  will further assess Y* in Section 3.4.
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.2. Tax (Stage 2)
Given the outcome of Stage 1, the elite coalition chooses the tax rate . Since violence specialists are homogeneous, there
s no difference between choosing a tax rate that maximizes individual payoffs or one that maximizes the payoff to the
oalition as a whole. Substituting (10) for Y, the coalition payoff E equals e times individual elite payoff (5):
E = e
(
1
e
)
(e, w)Y() = (e, w)ˇ
(
(1 − )(e, w)˛ˇ

) ˛
1−˛
. (11)
e  can now maximize and solve for  to ﬁnd:
∗ = 1 − ˛. (12)
ur ﬁrst result follows directly.
roposition 1. In equilibrium, the optimal tax rate * decreases linearly in ˛, and is independent of ˇ,  , , and m.
Given  ˛ < 1, the equilibrium tax rate is strictly smaller than 1. The elite coalition abstains from fully taxing away its
ontrolled production. When  ˛ is low the effect of the tax rate on production is small and hence, it is optimal to set a high
ax rate. The opposite holds when  ˛ is high.
.3. Occupation choice (Stage 1)
Each violence specialist chooses his occupation  ∈ {0, 1} to maximize his payoff as given by (5) and (6), taking into
ccount the effects of occupation choice on payoffs via (1) on the Stage 2 tax rate and Stage 3 production. Recall our equili-
rating mechanism of equal payoffs to both occupations such that i =  for all i ∈ V. Applying this mechanism, we equate
5) and (6) to ﬁnd the equilibrium ratio of elite members to warlords, which is independent of production:
e
w
= (e, w)
1 − (e, w) . (13)
By the speciﬁcation of (e, w) in (1), the size of the elite-controlled production depends positively on the ratio of elites
o warlords. Since our economy has a population of ﬁxed size and does not allow mobility between violence specialists and
roducers, the number of violence specialists is also ﬁxed at e + w:  an increase in e implies a decrease in w of equal size and
ice versa. We  use this model feature and also substitute (1) for (e, w)  in the equilibrium ratio (13). After simpliﬁcation
nd substitution of (12) for  we obtain the equilibrium elite–warlord ratio as a function of parameters ˛, m,  and :
e∗
w∗
= ((1 − ˛)) 11−m . (14)
y substituting w∗ = |V | − e∗, we also obtain e* and w∗ separately:
e∗ =
(
((1 − ˛)) 11−m
((1 − ˛)) 11−m + 1
)
|V |; (15)
w∗ =
(
1
((1 − ˛)) 11−m + 1
)
|V |. (16)
The elite–warlord ratio (14) increases with the tax rate. It also increases with m when (1 − ˛) > 1 which implies e∗w∗ > 1.
n that case, the elite has an advantage in generating rents as a combined effect of controlling and taxing production. Given
 < 1, proﬁt per occupation, in both occupations, decreases with the size of the group. Therefore, equilibrium group size can
e interpreted as the relative proﬁtability of an occupation, with the larger group having an advantage in generating rents.
For the limit case where  = 1, and since  ˛ ∈ (0, 1), the elite–warlord ratio is strictly smaller than 1, approaching unity only
n the limit where the tax rate (i.e. 1 − ˛) approaches 1. Put differently, in absence of an elite ﬁghting advantage, the number
f elite members is never larger than the number of warlords. This cap on elite size follows from our model feature that
arlords fully appropriate their controlled production, whereas elite members do not necessarily. Hence, elite members,
y construction, have a disadvantage in terms of their capacity to generate rents, which can be offset only by their ﬁghting
dvantage in case  > 1.
In Fig. 1 we  plot (15), the equilibrium number of elite members e*, and (14), the equilibrium elite–warlord ratio, as a
unction of (1 − ˛) for different values of parameter m. This ﬁgure illustrates that the presence of a sizeable elite coalition
n a natural state is not trivial. An (almost) empty elite coalition is possible for low values of (1 − ˛). In contrast, an elite
oalition that contains (nearly) all violence specialists is possible for high values of (1 − ˛) and high m. Note that, by the
xponent 11−m in (15) and (16), these are limit results for  going to zero or inﬁnity. Both e
* and w∗ converge to, but will
ever reach, 0 or |V|, ruling out any corner solutions.
From (14) follows our next result.
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(Fig. 1. Equilibrium size of the elite coalition e* and equilibrium elite–warlord ratio e
∗
w∗ as a function of (1 − ˛) for |V| = 50, and different values of parameter
m.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the elite–warlord ratio e
∗
w∗ is:
(i) decreasing with output elasticity ˛;
(ii) independent of the technology-cost ratio ˇ ;
iii) increasing with elite ﬁghting advantage ;
(iv) decreasing with the decisiveness of group size m if and only if (1 − ˛) < 1.
Proof. The results follow directly from the relevant ﬁrst order conditions to (14). 
3.4. Producer welfare (back to Stage 3)
The negative relation between output elasticity  ˛ and the equilibrium elite–warlord ratio naturally results in the question
whether and, if so, under what conditions the representative producer beneﬁts from the presence of a large elite coalition.
Our results show three countervailing effects with respect to ˛. First, there is a direct positive effect of  ˛ on production
(see (8)). Second, there is an indirect positive effect of  ˛ on production via the tax rate (see Proposition 1). Third, there is
an indirect negative effect of  ˛ on production via the elite–warlord ratio (see Proposition 2). We assess this combination of
effects on production by evaluating the equilibrium production level through substitution of the equilibrium elite–warlord
ratio and the equilibrium tax rate. From this equilibrium production level, we can then proceed to evaluate producer utility
(4), our measure of producer welfare.
We  ﬁrst rewrite the CSF in (1) in terms of the elite–warlord ratio by multiplying both RHS fraction terms with
(
em
)−1
:
(e, w) =
⎛
⎝ 1
1 +
(
1
( ew )
m
)
⎞
⎠ . (17)
We  then proceed to substitute (14) for ew in order to obtain (e
∗, w∗) in equilibrium:
(e∗, w∗) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ 1
1 +
(
(1−˛)
((1−˛))
1
1−m
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (18)
Next, we substitute (12) for  and (18) for (e, w) in the equilibrium production level (10), to obtain equilibrium production
as a function of exogenous parameters only:Y∗ = ˇ
(
˛2ˇ

) ˛
1−˛
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ 1
1 +
(
(1−˛)
((1−˛))
1
1−m
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
˛
1−˛
. (19)
From (19) follows our next result.
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roposition 3. In equilibrium, production Y* is:
(i) increasing with the technology-cost ratio ˇ ;
(ii) increasing with elite ﬁghting advantage ;
iii) decreasing with the decisiveness of group size m if and only if (1 − ˛) < 1.
roof. The results follow directly from the relevant ﬁrst order conditions to (19). 
Note that Proposition 3 does not cover the impact of  ˛ on optimal production. The relevant ﬁrst order condition to (19)
an be solved analytically using logarithmic differentiation, which yields the following expression:
∂Y∗
∂˛
= ˇ
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ ˛2ˇ

(
1 + (1−˛)
((1−˛))
1
1−m
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
˛
1−˛
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(1 − ˛)
(
2 − ˛m
(1−m)(2−˛)((1−˛))
1
1−m
)
+ ln[a2ˇ] − ln
[

(
1 + (1−˛)
((1−˛))
1
1−m
)]
(1 − ˛)2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
(20)
learly, this comparative static is ambiguous in sign and depends crucially on parameter values. Therefore, we evaluate (19)
umerically for a wide range of values for ˇ,  , , and m below. First, however, a few observations on (20) can be made.
he ﬁrst term on the right-hand side – which is simply equilibrium output – is strictly positive and has a wide range that
epends mostly on the technology-cost ratio ˇ .
8 The second term on the right-hand side of (20) features three additive
lements, none of which has an unambiguous sign. The ﬁrst logarithmic term is positive for sufﬁciently high ˇ, while the
econd logarithmic term is positive – thus entering negatively in the total fraction – for sufﬁciently high  . For high values
f  ˛ and m, however, the ﬁrst term turns negative and dominates the logarithmic terms.
To sum up, the comparative static effect of  ˛ on Y* is small when the technology-cost ratio is low, but can increase sub-
tantially with ˛. However, it turns negative for high values of ˛. Parameters m and  limit the magnitude of the comparative
tatic effect and m increases the likelihood of a negative sign as well. This suggest a hump-shaped effect of  ˛ that becomes
ore pronounced for low m and  and a high technology-cost ratio.
The numerical simulation reveals that, for most parameter combinations, production is not very sensitive to ˛; the
ountervailing effects identiﬁed in the beginning of Section 3.4 cancel each other out. There is one exception that conﬁrms
ur earlier observations. When  ˇ is sufﬁciently large relative to  and m is sufﬁciently small, production peaks for relatively
igh values of ˛. Example plots for different values of  ˇ and m are provided in Fig. 2. The increase in production for sufﬁciently
igh  ˛ and  ˇ is largely driven by a peak in optimal effort (9), which is subsequently offset (for even higher ˛) by the effect of
ncreasing appropriation. Fig. 2 also illustrates that for low values of ˛, production may  be decreasing in ˛. This is the case
hen the optimal level of effort chosen by the representative producer is below 1.8 To see this, note that the exponent tends to inﬁnity for high values of ˛, whereas the base of the exponent is smaller than 1 for many parameter values.
he  base is a fraction where the numerator has  ˇ ∈ (0, ∞) multiplied by ˛2 ∈ (0, 1), whereas the denominator has  ∈ (0, ∞) multiplied by a term that is
trictly larger than one, although bounded by parameters  and m.
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(Fig. 3. Equilibrium producer utility U* as a function of ˛; example plots for  = 1,  = 2, and different values of parameters  ˇ and m.
Substituting (12) for , (18) for (e, w), (19) for Y() and (9) for  in the representative producer’s utility function (4), we
obtain, after substantial simpliﬁcation:
U∗ =
(
(1 − ˛)
˛
)(
˛2ˇ

) 1
1−˛
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ 1
1 +
(
(1−˛)
((1−˛))
1
1−m
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
1
1−˛
, (21)
which is strictly positive under our parameter assumptions.
Based on (21), the effects of model parameters on producer welfare are summarized in our next result.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, producer utility U* is:
(i) increasing with the technology-cost ratio ˇ ;
(ii) increasing with elite ﬁghting advantage ;
iii) decreasing with the decisiveness of group size m if and only if (1 − ˛) < 1;
(iv) hump-shaped in the output elasticity ˛.
Proof. The results for parts (i)–(iii) follow directly from the relevant ﬁrst order conditions to (21). For part (iv), we derive
the relevant ﬁrst order condition to (21) using logarithmic differentiation, which yields the following expression:
∂U∗
∂˛
=
(
(1 − ˛)
˛
)(
˛2ˇ

) 1
1−˛
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ 1
1 +
(
(1−˛)
((1−˛))
1
1−m
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
1
1−˛ (
1 + ((1 − ˛)) 11−m + ˛(m−1)
˛(1 − ˛)(((1 − ˛)) 11−m + (1 − ˛))
)
. (22)
All terms in this expression are positive, except for ˛/(m − 1)  in the numerator. As a result, negative values can only be
obtained for high  ˛ (relative to ), which implies a hump-shaped curve. 
To illustrate the hump-shaped relation between  ˛ and U*, we evaluated (21) numerically for a wide range of values for ˇ,
 , , and m. Example plots for different values of  ˇ and m are provided in Fig. 3, which is directly comparable to Fig. 2. This
ﬁgure illustrates the combination of direct and indirect effects of  ˛ on utility – as discussed in the beginning of this section.
Utility is low for both low  ˛ and, perhaps surprisingly, high ˛. Maximal welfare levels are reached for intermediate values
of ˛. The explanation for this shape is largely found in the level of the appropriation rate and the return to investments in
effort. The appropriation rate equals the sum of taxation by elite and full rent extraction by warlords. It can be expressed as
(e, w)(1 − ˛) + (1 − (e, w)) = 1 − ˛(e, w). From this expression follows immediately that the appropriation rate tends to
1 for low ˛. Also, by (18) we know that (e∗, w∗) is decreasing in ˛, which implies increasing rent extraction by warlords.
Jointly, these effects make that the appropriation rate follows a U-shape with minimal appropriation for intermediate levels
of ˛.
All in all, producers are best off with intermediate levels of ˛, where their production peaks through substantial invest-
ments in effort and the level of appropriation is still relatively low. Combined with low m and substantial , the elite coalition
is not very large (see Fig. 1), but is able to control the bulk of production. Lower levels of  ˛ would decrease the return to
investments in effort — e.g. higher tax and lower elasticity of output, while higher levels of  ˛ would lead to increased
appropriation by warlords. Both effects are detrimental to producer utility.
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. Extensions
In this section we consider three extension to our model. So far, we have assumed a frictionless elite coalition which
tands in sharp contrast to some of the real world examples that were referred to in the introduction. Two  main sources of
riction within the elite coalition are the distribution of the collectively generated tax rent, and possible barriers to entry for
ew members. These are just two possible examples of frictions within the elite coalition, but they are important ones and
iscussed in the ﬁrst two  extensions. In Section 4.3 we  endogenize the size of the group of violence specialists, dropping our
ssumption that violence specialists cannot switch to become producers – while maintaining that mobility in the opposite
irection is restricted in natural states.
.1. Within-coalition conﬂict
In the natural state, the elite emerges out of the pool of violence specialists, and cooperation of violence specialists in the
lite coalition is not self-evident. Given the outcome of Stages 1–3, members of the elite coalition may  engage in conﬂict over
he tax rent. There are various ways to model such conﬂict and one could even argue that an appropriately designed sharing
ule or voting procedure could eliminate the incentive for rent-seeking within the coalition. Indeed, the mere possibility of
ithin-coalition conﬂict can be interpreted as characterizing an earlier state of development than the setting of our base
odel, where within-coalition conﬂict is absent by construction. One could, in the spirit of North et al. (2009), argue that
he absence of conﬂict within the coalition is a result of a more developed ‘rule-of-law’ among the elite.9
We  proceed with a simple conﬂict model that we include as Stage 4 of our model. This simple set-up is sufﬁcient to
emonstrate the impact of the prospect of conﬂict on elite size. We  do so using a ratio-form CSF, similar to (1). As with
1), the CSF can be interpreted as probabilistic or, assuming risk-neutrality, as deﬁning shares to each elite member. Here
e stick to the non-probabilistic interpretation. Each elite member receives a share 
i(s) of the tax rent, which depends on
ostly investments in conﬂict by all members, captured in the vector s = (si : i ∈ E):

i(s) =
sn
i∑
j ∈ Es
n
j
, (23)
ith n ∈ (0, 1) being the decisiveness parameter for within-coalition conﬂict.
We update the payoff function (5) to elites:
i = 
i(s)(e, w)Y() − si ∀i ∈ E. (24)
ow, in Stage 1 violence specialists choose the most proﬁtable occupation whilst taking into account not only the optimal
ax rate and production, but also the severity of conﬂict within the coalition. Note that the combination of Stage 1 and Stage
 resembles models of sequential inter- and intra-group resource contest (Wärneryd, 1998; Esteban and Sákovics, 2003;
arﬁnkel, 2004; Inderst et al., 2007). We  add to this the interaction between violence specialists and producers.
Given outcomes of Stages 1–3, each elite member chooses si to maximize his payoff as given by (24):
∂i
∂si
= ∂
i(s)
∂si
(e, w)Y() − 1 = 0 ∀i ∈ E. (25)
ote that we exclude the peaceful outcome where si = 0 for each agent. Such a peaceful outcome cannot be an equilibrium to
he conﬂict since one elite member j could secure the complete resource with a small investment in conﬂict sj > 0 (Garﬁnkel
nd Skaperdas, 2007). This opportunity would not be left unexploited in equilibrium, which is why we exclude it from our
nalysis.
By (23) we have:
∂
i(s)
∂si
=
nsn−1
i
∑
j ∈ E\{i}s
n
j(∑
j ∈ Es
n
j
)2 . (26)
ith homogeneous violence specialists, such that si = s for each i ∈ E, we  can simplify this derivative to
∂
i(s)
∂si
= n(e − 1)
se2
. (27)
ubstituting this simpliﬁed derivative into (25) and solving for s, we  obtain:s =
(
e − 1
e2
)
n(e, w)Y(). (28)
9 We thank a reviewer for making this observation.
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∗
w∗ as a function of (1 − ˛) for n = 1, |V| = 50, and different values of
parameter m.
Note that we cannot proceed by substituting our previously found equilibrium values, since these may  be affected by the
prospect of within-coalition conﬂict on Stage 1–3 decisions. Speciﬁcally, this prospect affects the elite–warlord ratio. It does
not affect our result on the optimal tax rate and it also does not affect our results on optimal production or producer welfare,
except through this ratio. To show the effect of within-coalition conﬂict on ew , we equate (24) with (6) and we substitute
(28) for si, to obtain:(
1 − n + n/e
e
)
(e, w) =
(
1
w
)
(1 − (e, w)). (29)
We  can now rearrange terms to ﬁnd the equilibrium elite–warlord ratio, which is again independent from production Y:
e
w
=
(
1 − n + n/e
)
(e, w)
1 − (e, w) . (30)
We  substitute (1) for (e, w) and (10) for  in the equilibrium ratio (30). After simpliﬁcation we  obtain the following
elite–warlord ratio as a function of exogenous parameters and e:
e
w
= (
(
1 − n + n/e
)
(1 − ˛))
1
1−m . (31)
Comparing (30) with the related ratio in the standard version of our model (14), we see that an additional term (1 − n + n/e)
has entered the solution. This term is driven by the anticipation of conﬂict in the fourth stage of the model (recall n is the
decisiveness parameter for within-coalition conﬂict). For n → 0, the effect of Stage 4 within-coalition conﬂict on Stage 1
occupation choice vanishes; the ratio e
∗
w∗ converges to the ratio (14) of the standard version of our model.
We continue to assess the effect of within-coalition conﬂict on ew by substituting |V| − e for w in (31) and using implicit
differentiation:
d
dn
e∗ = (e − e
2)(|V | − e)2
n(|V | − e)2 + (1 − m)(|V |e2)(1 − n + n/e) mm−1 ((1 − ˛)) 1m−1
< 0. (32)
All terms of (32) are positive, with the exception of the term (e − e2) in the numerator. Hence, ddn e∗ < 0. As a result, we ﬁnd
that the elite–warlord ratio e
∗
w∗ is decreasing with the decisiveness of within-coalition conﬂict n. To illustrate this result we
reproduce Fig. 1 (which features no within-coalition ﬁghting, hence n = 0), for the case where n = 1. Values for e* and e
∗
w∗ in
Fig. 4 are computed by solving (31) numerically for n = 1 using the Newton–Raphson method. Comparison of both ﬁgures
shows that the limit case of the model with n = 1 implies a substantially smaller elite coalition in equilibrium. Choosing
the elite occupation has become less attractive compared to the standard version of our model, because of the prospect of
within-coalition conﬂict. Obviously, this difference in elite size is mitigated if we allow for the possibility that warlords also
engage in a conﬂict over their appropriative rents. Such warlord conﬂict would obviously decrease warlord payoffs. The
combined effect of warlord conﬂict and within-coalition conﬂict on elite size will depend on the relative decisiveness of
both conﬂicts. Note that we will need much of the above derivations to introduce our results in the remainder of this section,
which do not depend on the existence or not of warlord conﬂict.
Our analysis up to here allows us to assess the impact of the number of contestants on investments in conﬂict. A standard
result from rent-seeking models (cf. Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas, 2007) is that an increase in the number of contestants decreases
individual investments in conﬂict. The intuition for this result is that in the presence of more competitors the expected return
to investments in conﬂict decreases. In the context of our paper, this result would imply that the effect of an increase of
e on s* is negative. In conﬂict models with endogenous production, however, this result is reversed (Hirshleifer, 1995): an
increase in the number of contestants increases individual investments in conﬂict. The intuition is that, as the number of
contestants increases, a smaller fraction of own production can be retained and hence investments in conﬂict become more
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ttractive. Our next proposition shows that in the setting of our paper, where production is the domain of a separate subset
f producers and subject to interaction with violence specialists, both results are combined. Speciﬁcally, an increase in the
ize of the elite coalition decreases the aggregate level of appropriation which provides incentives to increase production.
ncreased production, in turn, provides incentives to increase investments in conﬂict. This indirect positive effect may  offset
he direct negative effect of e on s*.
roposition 5. In equilibrium, within-coalition investments in costly conﬂict s* are hump-shaped in the size of the elite coalition
 with a global maximum eˆ ∈  R  : eˆ = 2−Z(eˆ)1−Z(eˆ) , where Z(e) = m1−˛ (1 − (e, w)).
roof. Using (28), we ﬁrst derive the ﬁrst order condition ∂s
∗
∂e
and solve for e which yields the implicit function
e = 2(1 − ˛)(e
m + wm) − mwm
(1 − ˛)(em + wm) − mwm =
2 − Z(e)
1 − Z(e) , (33)
here Z(e) = m1−˛ (1 − (e, w)). The second derivative of (28) with respect to e is rather involved, so we conﬁrmed concavity
f ∂s
∗
∂e
numerically. Given the domains of parameters  ˛ and m and the function (e, w), we have that Z(e) > 0. By (33), Z(e) > 0
mplies that eˆ is unbounded (e.g. consider cases with  ˛ and m such that Z(e) is close to unity).
To gain further insights into the effect of e on s*, notice that e not only affects s* directly but also through (e, w) and
(), where  depends on e through (e, w). To evaluate these effects separately we take the total derivative of (28) to e (to
educe notational clutter we write (e, w) as  and Y() as Y):
ds∗
de
= ∂s
∗
∂e
+ ∂s
∗
∂
d
de
+ ∂s
∗
∂Y
∂Y
∂
d
de
. (34)
e  ﬁnd that these three effects are given by:
∂s∗
∂e
=
[
−
(
e − 2
e3
)
nY
]
; (35)
∂s∗
∂
d
de
=
[(
e − 1
e2
)
nY
]
×
[
(1 − )
(
m
e
)]
; (36)
∂s∗
∂Y
∂Y
∂
d
de
=
[(
e − 1
e2
)
n
]
×
[
(1 − )
(
m
e
)]
×
[(
˛
1 − ˛
)
ˇ

(
(1 − )˛ˇ

) ˛
1−˛
]
. (37)
he direct effect of an increase of e on s* in (35) is negative (as long as e > 2), while both indirect effects in (36) and (37) are
ositive for e > 1. An increase in e increases both the share of production controlled by elite members as well as (indirectly)
he production level. Both of these contribute to a higher tax rent, which makes ﬁghting more attractive. Depending on
arameter values the positive or negative effect dominates as stated in the proposition. 
.2. Limiting access to the coalition
In this extension, we assess whether elite members have an incentive to limit entry into the coalition in order to avoid
ilution of the tax rent. It seems reasonable to assume that access into the coalition should require consent of the coalition
embers. In the literature on coalition formation in games with externalities it is shown that the rules of coalition formation
ay  impact the coalition size. Speciﬁcally, requiring consent on membership – called ‘exclusive membership’ in this literature
 is one such rule. In a negative externality game (as we have here), it normally implies smaller coalitions with higher payoffs
er member compared to ‘open membership’ (Yi, 1997).
Below we will illustrate that this result does not necessarily hold in our setting. We  do not impose a speciﬁc membership
ule but rather compare the impact of exogenous coalition size on individual elite member payoffs, and subsequently compare
hese payoffs to those under the endogenous equilibrium coalition size derived in (15). Doing so, we ﬁnd that elite payoffs
re not necessarily maximized at the endogenously determined coalition size (15). Instead, members of the elite coalition
ay  prefer an alternative elite size, which may  be smaller or larger, depending on parameter combinations in the model. The
ationale behind this result follows form our equilibrium mechanism. The elite coalition cannot attract more (less) violence
pecialists because in equilibrium the payoff to the marginal warlord is even higher (lower) than that of the elite members.
his result is illustrated in Fig. 5 for different parameter combinations of  ˛ and m.
Fig. 5 shows the elite payoff function (5). Substitute (12) for  and (10) for Y() and rearrange to obtain elite payoffs as a
unction of exogenous parameters and e:
i =
(
((e, w))
1
1−˛
e
)
(1 − ˛)ˇ
(
˛2ˇ

) ˛
1−˛
. (38)
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  = 2, and different values of parameter m.  Circles indicate the endogenous equilibrium coalition size for each m.
Only the ﬁrst RHS term of (38) depends on e and only this term was used to construct Fig. 5, the other terms being constant
for given parameter values. The ﬁgure shows individual elite payoffs as a function of elite coalition size e for three values
of m.  It also displays, for each m,  the equilibrium coalition size as the outcome of our model. Clearly, elite members could
beneﬁt from a change in the size of the elite coalition. For m = 0.3, elite members would beneﬁt from a decrease in elite size.
Conversely, for m = 0.7, elite members would beneﬁt from an increase in elite size. For m = 0.5, they are largely indifferent.
Only when elite members prefer a smaller coalition they would beneﬁt from implementing exclusive membership. When
they prefer a larger coalition, then apparently the equilibrium payoffs to warlords are sufﬁciently large to keep them out of
the coalition; no warlord has an incentive to switch and become a member. In such a setting, exclusive membership would
not affect coalition size.
The dependence of preferred elite size on m is due to the extent of diminishing marginal returns to group formation for
any m < 1. If m is low, group size becomes less relevant for the share of production controlled by the elite than if m is large.
Hence, for low m,  a smaller elite coalition would increase the tax rent per elite member. The opposite effect holds for high
m.
4.3. Endogenous exit
One question that may  arise is how the proﬁtability of warlordism and elite membership affects the equilibrium number
of violence specialists. As a ﬁnal extension, we scrutinize this question by endogenizing the number of violence specialists,
allowing them to switch and become a producer themselves.10 Recall our argument in Section 1 that entry of violence
specialists is exceptional for a variety of reasons while exit is possible though in principle not attractive. In assessing the
impact of possible exit on model outcomes, we assume that the exiting violence specialist will earn a payoff equal to the
representative producer. The alternative approach is to drop the assumption of a representative producer and, instead,
explicitly model the size of the producing population. Both approaches yield qualitatively similar results, but one advantage
of the current approach is that we need not make explicit assumptions on the size of the producing population. We assume
that the number of violence specialists is small compared to the producing population, such that any switch will not affect
aggregate production. As before, violence specialists choose their preferred occupation, elite member or warlord, but now
the third option is to exit and become a producer. To assess the resulting equilibrium, we  equate violence specialists’ payoff
from (5) and (6) with the representative producer’s utility (4). In doing so, we  account for the cost of maintaining a patronage
network by subtracting cost parameter  from the specialists’ payoffs. The resulting functions, with superscript x indicating
the possibility of exit, are:
xi = i −  ∀i ∈ E; (39)
xj = j −  ∀j ∈ W;  (40)
xk = U ∀k /∈ E ∪ W.  (41)
An important observation is that these afﬁne transformations of payoff functions do not affect the choice of effort  nor
tax rate  in the base model of Section 2. In other words, for given parameter values, endoginizing the number of violence
specialists does not change our model results. As a result, both equilibrium production Y* and the equilibrium elite–warlord
ratio e
∗
w∗ remain unchanged, which also ﬁxes the controlled share (e
∗, w∗) and, ﬁnally, the representative producer’s utility
10 There is also a literature on endogenous alliance or coalition formation wherein multiple and competing coalitions can emerge. In our interpretation
of  the elite coalition as the state such an alternative coalition would in principle form an additional state. Co-existence of multiple coalitions is analysed
by  a.o. Skaperdas (1998) and Garﬁnkel (2004).
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rig. 6. Equilibrium number of elite members and warlords as a function of patronage cost 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 = 2,  = 1, m = 0.5,  = 1.5 (left panel), and  = 0.03 (right panel).
*. The only important question that remains is how the total number of violence specialists may  be affected by key model
arameters.
Consider a violence specialist that switches to become a producer. For illustrative purposes, assume this specialist belongs
o the elite coalition. The exit implies that in the new situation we have e′ = e − 1. The new producer will earn the represen-
ative producer’s utility. Since production is not affected, by (41) each elite member will have a higher payoff as they can
ow share their appropriated production, whose level remains unchanged, among a smaller number of elite members; see
5) and (6) upon which (39) and (40) are based. The same result follows for warlords, since the equilibrium elite–warlord
atio remains unchanged and hence, in equilibrium, the number of warlords will adjust downward.
The equilibrium numbers of elite members and warlords can be derived by equating payoffs (39) and (40). We  did so
lready for the ratio of elite members to warlords in (14). Next, we equate payoffs to elite members (39) and the representative
roducer (41), which yields the following implicit expressions for both e* and – using (14) – w∗:
e∗ =
(
(1 − ˛)(e∗, w∗)Y∗
 ˛ (1 − ˛)(e∗, w∗)Y∗ + 
)
; (42)
w∗ =
(
(1 − ˛)(e∗, w∗)Y∗
 ˛ (1 − ˛)(e∗, w∗)Y∗ + 
)(
1
((1 − ˛)) 11−m
)
, (43)
here (e∗, w∗) and Y* take their equilibrium values from (18) and (19). Combining (14) with (42), we  can calculate the
umbers of elite members and warlords under endogenous exit. As an illustration we limit ourselves to assessing the impact
f two parameters on these numbers: patronage costs  and cooperative quality . Starting with , since all terms in (42)
nd (43) are positive, we ﬁnd that ∂e*/∂ < 0 and ∂w∗/∂ < 0. Given the unchanged equilibrium elite–warlord ratio from
14), this implies that both the number of elite members and warlords decrease in patronage costs. The impact of  is more
uanced, because it affects the equilibrium elite–warlord ratio. Since both ∂(e∗, w∗)/∂ > 0 and ∂Y*/∂ > 0, we have that
e*/∂ > 0. The number of elite members increases with cooperative quality . The number of warlords increases with  too,
ut only for sufﬁciently high  ˛ and low ; it decreases otherwise because the second term in (43) decreases in .
The effects of endogenous exit are illustrated in Fig. 6 which displays the impact of patronage costs  as well as cooperative
uality  on the equilibrium number of elite members and warlords. As shown, when  increases it becomes more attractive
or violence specialists to exit and become a producer. Note that the equilibrium elite–warlord ratio, equal to 1/4 for the
arameter values in Fig. 6, is independent of . When  increases, the elite coalition grows, but the impact on the number of
arlords is ambiguous. The combined effect is that the number of violence specialists is ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing in
.
. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we provide economic intuition for the natural state by analysing the role of organized large-scale violence and
ow it is contained. We  start from the observation that natural states lack a monopoly on violence concentrated in ‘the state’,
ut assert that the capacity for large-scale violence is concentrated in the hands of a small subset of the population that we
erm ‘violence specialists’ (North et al., 2009). These violence specialists choose between exploiting their violence capacities
or pure appropriative purposes or to impose a degree of order, where we  refer to the former category as ‘warlords’ and the
atter as ‘elites’. The elite join forces in a coalition of equals where they agree to respect each other’s privileges and rents, and
o jointly ﬁght off warlords. This relative security in turn allows the elite coalition to incorporate the consequences of their
ppropriative behaviour on total production in their appropriation rate – resembling the behaviour of stationary bandits
n the fashion of McGuire and Olson (1996) and Usher (1989). Production is generated by a representative producer that
esponds to appropriation by limiting its investment in effort – the only variable input in our production function. In contrast,
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warlords operate alone and face continuous pressure on their rents from other violence specialists, which induces them to
fully appropriate all production they control. The share of production controlled by warlords and elite members is determined
by a deterministic standard contest success function, featuring diminishing returns in group size and a cooperative advantage
to the elite coalition relative to warlords (Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Konrad, 2009). As a result, warlords have a natural
advantage in appropriation rates over elite members, whereas elite members have a contest-advantage over warlords.
Our model illustrates the rigidity of natural states. We  ﬁnd that elite members are responsive to the economic conse-
quences of their appropriation on production, thus restricting their tax rate, and more so the higher the output elasticity of
effort. However, lower tax rates imposed by the elite increase the appropriative advantage of warlords over elite members.
As a result, more violence specialists will opt to become warlord, in turn increasing the general appropriation rate imposed
the violence specialists at large, and at least partially offsetting the elite members’ appropriation decline following limited
taxation. Due to this trade-off, our results indicate that the total appropriation rate of warlords and elite members combined
is rather stable for most parameter combinations. Only when the output elasticity of effort is high – inducing low tax rates
– combined with strong cooperative quality of the elite and a low decisiveness of conﬂict – allowing the relatively small
elite coalition to control a relatively large share of total production – do we ﬁnd comparatively high levels of production and
producer welfare. These results point to a delicate balance between welfare and order as also observed by Bates et al. (2002).
Dal Bó et al. (2015) analyse this balance as a pre-institutional process, arguing that institutions play no role in explaining
different outcomes across states. Their setting is different – i.e. a monolithic incumbent with given defence and growth
capabilities owns a productive asset and is challenged by a predatory competitor – and we  place our analysis in the speciﬁc
institutional context of a natural state, but their conclusion is similar to ours: order is a necessary condition in stimulating
production and thus welfare, but welfare, in turn, decreases the likelihood of order. Like Dal Bó et al. (2015), our results chal-
lenge existing explanations for welfare that focus on the intentional design of institutions by the elite fostering or limiting
production and appropriation (cf. Grossman, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Thus, our model is capable to answer, at least partially, why  societies with an extractive elite emerge and persist. The
traditional answer is that the elite is better off in an extractive and exclusive regime and powerful enough to maintain it
(Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Grossman, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). In contrast, we start from the assertion
by North et al. (2009) that violence is an endemic threat to the stability of societies, arguing that a society with a small
and extractive elite coalition is the natural social order since it guarantees a certain degree of order and stability, through
a system of coercive rent extraction rather than by unconstrained, and potentially violent, appropriation. To this, we  add
that violence specialists have a potentially lucrative alternative option when they operate as warlords outside – and in
competition with – the elite coalition. We  view this as a permanent situation where the fragile elite coalition forms the de
facto state while many violence specialists remain tempted by the warlord-option. Thus, even though incorporating a broad
range of violence specialists into the elite coalition may  be optimal for the leaders of the elite coalition – as is convincingly
shown by Francois et al. (2015) – and for society at large, an elite coalition that completely eradicates warlords is unlikely
in natural states.
In our extensions we further probe the relation between the average payoff for elite members and the size of the coalition.
There are two  alternative results put forward in the literature. Francois et al. (2015) argue that increasing the size of the elite
coalition generally increases the average payoff to elite members, because the marginal elite member requires the highest
reward for joining. In contrast, North et al. (2009) suggest that the elite coalition generally has an incentive to restrict its
own size because this increases the average payoff per elite member. We  provide two  further insight into these results. First,
in Section 4.2 we show that the relation between the average payoff per elite member and the size of the elite coalition is
ambiguous, and crucially depends on the decisiveness of group size in conﬂict. When the decisiveness of group size is low
(high) the endogenous ratio of elite members to warlords is too high (low) for the average elite member. That is the average
elite might be better off limiting the number of coalition members when decisiveness is low. A reduction in the number
of elite is problematic, because the option of becoming warlord at such an equilibrium is even less lucrative such that no
elite members will willingly leave the coalition. Our second insight follows from the introduction of distributive conﬂict
in the elite coalition discussed in Section 4.1. While a standard result in the literature on conﬂict and appropriation is that
investment in conﬂict decreases with the number of contenders (Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas, 2007), we show that this effect
within the coalition is mitigated by the fact that an increase in the size of the coalition results in an increase of the contested
resource pool – i.e. output under control of the elite coalition. This in turn stimulates investment in conﬂict. Which effect
dominates depends on parameter values.
Our results imply that almost all natural states experience continuous coercion exercised by elite members and violence
between elite coalitions and warlords, as is most conspicuously observed in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. We show that this is
not a temporary out-of-equilibrium-situation but a permanent phenomenon. There is an inherent tendency in natural states
to have rebellions and competing factions, not necessarily because of ethnic or religious rivalries, ideological struggles or
social injustice, but because of the fundamental economic mechanisms of the natural state resulting in numerous violence
specialists opting for the ‘warlord-option’ (see for the role of economic factors on rebellions and civil strife also Collier
and Hoefﬂer, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; van der Ploeg, 2011). Our model provides insights on how these economic
mechanisms work. Speciﬁcally, we show that unrest is exacerbated when the output elasticity of effort is high, because it
induces elite members to limit their tax rate, which in turn results in a strong tendency towards warlordism. We  have also
shown that this mechanism is partly mitigated by the cooperative quality of the elite coalition for two reasons. First, its
cooperative quality allows a coalition of given size to control more production, inducing more violence specialists to join to
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lite coalition, further increasing its control over production. Second, in our last extension, we  show that increases in the
ooperative quality may  even induce some warlords to abandon their capacities as violence specialist completely and turn
o production instead.
More tentatively, our results on the interaction between order and production carry implications for the resource-curse
iterature that suggests that institutional quality determines to what extent natural resources are a curse – when institutions
re inferior – or a blessing (Bulte et al., 2005; van der Ploeg, 2011). Output elasticity can be related to the availability
f rich natural resources. Since the natural state can be equated with the weak or inferior institutions of the resource
urse literature, this result underpins Bulte et al. (2005) and Mehlum et al. (2006) and others in showing that the effect of
bundant resources on economic development is mediated by the quality of the institutional framework. Furthermore, the
ooperative quality of the elite coalition can be related to the development of a rule-of-law among elite members and the
evelopment of organizations within the coalition, as discussed in North et al. (2009) as part of the maturation process of
atural states; we have probed this maturation process elsewhere using historical case material (van Bavel et al., 2016).
ndeed, our results suggest that enhancing institutional quality mitigates the resource curse. However, the third condition
equired to obtain comparatively high production in our model is that the decisiveness of conﬂict is low, which seems at odds
ith the availability of natural resources. Especially, natural resources can be geographically concentrated – often referred
o as point-based natural resources – which brings about strong beneﬁts for the party that controls the particularly endowed
eographical areas. Consequently, we suggest that the point-based nature of natural resources increases the decisiveness
f conﬂict and, thus, forms an important determinant of the resource curse. The more concentrated natural resources are
n speciﬁc geographic areas, as is the case with many mineral resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, the more decisive conﬂict is,
nd the more unlikely a state is to escape the resource curse (Bulte et al., 2005; van der Ploeg, 2011).
Using the model developed in this paper, there are several promising avenues for further research. One concerns the
patial dimension of production and conﬂict in natural state, including the point-based nature of some natural resources,
igratory behaviour of producers in the face of coercion and violence, and the spread of violence and coercion itself. The
econd concerns the formation of patronage networks and potential heterogeneity across violence specialists. The third
oncerns the link between the current paper’s insights and the big question of how to escape the situation of violence and
oercion in natural states towards open democracies. Our results suggest that such an escape may  be even more problematic
han conventionally thought, because of the economic mechanisms underpinning the rigidity of natural states.
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